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NATURAL THEOLOGY AND RELIGIOUS DIVERSITY 
Harold Netland 
Whereas natural theology traditionally has been understood as an attempt to 
demonstrate the truth of Christian theism in light of the critiques of agnosti-
cism or atheism, our increased awareness of religious diversity in the West 
presents fresh questions demanding attention. Several ways in which recent 
philosophers such as John Hick, William Alston, and Alvin Plantinga have 
responded to challenges from religious diversity are explored, with limitations 
of their approaches noted. I argue that something like Ninian Smart's "soft 
natural theology" or worldview analysis is necessary for an adequate response 
to religious diversity today. 
Natural theology, understood as the attempt to establish claims about 
God's existence and / or nature apart from appeal to special revelation, pre-
supposes significant disagreement over religious beliefs. Thus the agenda 
of natural theology, as well as prospects for its success, depends in part 
upon the nature of the alternative perspectives to which it is a response. 
Whereas until fairly recently the available alternatives to Christian theism 
were rather limited (during medieval times, Judaism and Islam; in the 
modern era, religious agnosticism or atheism), from the 1960s on the West 
has been marked by increased awareness of religious diversity. Our neigh-
borhoods, schools and businesses include Buddhists, Hindus, Jains, Sikhs, 
Bal,ai's, Mormons, Muslims, Jews, Christians, and New Agers, as well as 
atheists. The cultural landscape of North America is being transformed, so 
that Diana Eck is only slightly guilty of hyperbole when she states, "The 
United States has become the most religiously diverse nation on earth."l In 
this essay I will explore some implications of our increased awareness of 
religious diversity for philosophy of religion, arguing that, for Christian 
thinkers, natural theology in some form can and should playa significant 
role in Christian responses to religious diversity. 
Natural theology is generally linked to the Christian theological tradi-
tions of medieval Europe, culminating in the magisterial system of Thomas 
Aquinas in the thirteenth century. For many today natural theology con-
tinues to be defined largely in terms of the agenda and methodology of 
Aquinas. Scott MacDonald characterizes this tradition, which I will call 
classical natural theology, as "a kind of demonstrative science" consisting 
of "truths about God which are either (1) self-evident or evident to sense 
perception, or (2) derived by deductively valid proofs the (ultimate) 
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premises of which are self-evident or evident to sense perception."2 Even a 
cursory survey of the philosophy of religion in the West from the thir-
teenth through the early nineteenth centuries indicates the enormous 
attraction of this vision of conclusive, demonstrative theistic arguments. 
But we should not restrict natural theology to the search for such 
demonstrative theistic arguments. In the early modem period, for example, 
John Locke, Joseph Butler and William Paley advanced inductive and 
probabilistic arguments for Christian theism. Thus, Eugene Long observes 
that "natural theology is also used in a broader and more inclusive sense to 
refer to all natural knowledge of God arrived at without appeal to the 
authority of revelation and faith as manifested in a particular community 
of faith."3 Whether understood in the classical deductive sense or more 
broadly, MacDonald correctly notes that natural theology "is justificatory 
in nature; that is, it is concerned with establishing the truth of certain theo-
logical propositions using standard techniques of reasoning starting from 
propositions that have some appropriate degree of epistemic justification."· 
With the numbers of religious agnostics and atheists increasing during the 
seventeenth through nineteenth centuries, the disagreements which natur-
al theology was called upon to resolve were those between Christian the-
ism and increasingly influential forms of non-religious naturalism. Since 
the question of God's existence was at the heart of the debate, special atten-
tion was given to theistic arguments. 
But the intellectual currents of modernity have not been kind to 
Christian theism. By the mid-nineteenth century it was widely accepted, by 
Christians and non-Christians alike, that Christian belief is irrational unless 
such belief could be shown to be justified. Moreover, in some intellectual 
circles the assumption that classical natural theology had been thoroughly 
discredited by David Hume and Immanuel Kant became virtually 
axiomatic. Writing in 1961, for example, Ninian Smart stated, "Natural the-
ology is the Sick Man of Europe. In view of the subtle and exhaustive 
objections adduced by Hume, Kant and modem empiricists against the tra-
ditional arguments for God's existence, it is no longer reasonable to rely 
upon these particular supports for theistic belief."s 
In one of the great ironies of modem intellectual history, however, by 
the 1970s and 80s there was a remarkable resurgence of interest in natural 
theology - including theistic arguments. And yet by the late twentieth 
century the intellectual and cultural contexts in the West had changed con-
siderably, so that traditional questions were being addressed in fresh ways 
and new issues were demanding attention. Three changes are especially 
significant. First, there was a clear move away from earlier attempts to 
demonstrate conclusively the truth of Christian theism to the more modest 
agenda of showing that it can be reasonable for the Christian in appropri-
ate circumstances to hold Christian beliefs.6 In part, this reflects a shift 
away from metaphysics (does God exist?) to epistemology (under what cir-
cumstances can it be reasonable for one to believe that God exists?). It is 
also indicative of the more modest expectations today in religious episte-
mology. Second, there was a move away from relying upon deductive the-
istic arguments in favor of an appeal to religious experience as providing 
the grounds for the rationality of Christian belief. Both of these changes 
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were responses to the increasingly vigorous critique of religious belief from 
agnostic or atheist skeptics, and they signal a departure from the method-
ology and expectations of classical natural theology. 
Third, whereas in the past the major intellectual rivals to Christian the-
ism were regarded as religious agnosticism and atheism, more recently 
there has been recognition that increased awareness of religious diversity 
itself poses significant questions for Christian claims. No longer are the 
options merely Christian theism and atheistic naturalism. The question is 
not simply whether to adopt a religious framework but which religious per-
spective to accept. Peter Berger takes us to the heart of the challenge from 
religious diversity when he states, "We do have a problem of belief, and it 
not only raises the question of why we should believe in God but why we 
should believe in this God. There are others, after all, and today they are 
made available in an unprecedented way through the religious supermar-
ket of modem pluralism."7 
Religious diversity stems from fundamental disagreement over the 
nature of the cosmos, the religious ultimate, the human predicament and 
how this predicament might be overcome. Each of the major religious tra-
ditions understands itself as having the correct answer to these questions. 
Which, if any, is right? Or are all to be rejected? It seems clear that aware-
ness of religious diversity does, for many people, reduce epistemic confi-
dence in the beliefs of their own tradition. Should it do so? What are the 
epistemic implications of deeply rooted religious disagreement?' These are 
not merely academic questions. Ordinary people regularly evaluate alter-
native perspectives and make choices. Baptists become Buddhists; atheists 
convert to Baha'i; Hindus become Roman Catholics; and Mormons tum 
into agnostics. A basic issue for religious epistemology, then, is the basis 
upon which one should choose among competing claims to religious truth. 
From the perspective of Christian theism, a viable religious epistemology 
should provide guidance in answering the question, Why should one be a 
Christian instead of accepting one of the many other religious and non-religious 
alternatives? 
Given the above, we might expect Christian philosophers today to 
devote considerable attention to this question. But this is not the case, and 
undoubtedly one reason for this is the much lower degree of confidence 
many philosophers today have in the capacity of rational reflection to settle 
fundamental disputes between worldviews. Many - Christian and non-
Christian alike - would embrace what can be called the epistemic parity 
thesis. This is the view that evidential and rational considerations relevant 
to religious belief are such that no particular religious tradition can be said 
to be rationally superior to others; the data are sufficiently ambiguous that 
the major religions enjoy more or less epistemic parity. In his important 
work Religious Ambiguity and Religious Diversity, Robert McKim articulates 
the thesis in terms of religious ambiguity: 
To say that the world is religiously ambiguous is to say that it is open 
to being read in various ways, both religious and secular, by intelli-
gent, honest people .... The presence of disagreement suggests that the 
matters about which there is disagreement are ambiguous. In partic-
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ular, disagreement in the area of religion suggests that this is an area 
in which the available evidence does not point clearly in one direc-
tion rather than another, and it suggests that the matters about which 
religions purport to speak are matters about which it is unclear what 
we ought to believe.9 
McKim claims that in light of such ambiguity we ought to adopt a mod-
erate skepticism and tentativeness in our beliefs. "It is unlikely that certain-
ty about the details of the doctrine of any particular religion about God is 
either obligatory or appropriate, and it is likely that tentative belief, at 
most, is appropriate." An appropriately tentative approach "will view dif-
ferent accounts of the nature or purposes of God, especially the details of 
those accounts, as equally likely to be true, as stabs in the right direction of 
something about which it is difficult to be certain. The implication is that 
theists ought to be skeptical of many of the claims about God that are made 
by the dominant theistic traditions, including their own."lO Whether such 
tepid commitment can be religiously satisfying is at least debatable. 
Moreover, it is far from obvious that the epistemic parity thesis is the best 
way to understand implications of religious diversity and disagreement. 
II 
The epistemic implications of awareness of religious diversity have been 
understood in various ways, which in tum prompt quite different respons-
es. I will note four possible perspectives, mentioning the first briefly and 
then giving greater attention to the other three. My concern throughout is 
with each perspective's capacity to answer the question why one should 
accept Christian claims rather than other religious alternatives, and the 
place of natural theology within each perspective in addressing this ques-
tion. I will argue that while the recent emphasis upon the rationality of 
Christian belief, as distinct from the truth of Christian claims, and the 
attempt to ground such rationality of belief in religious experiences can be 
effective in responding to certain critiques, they are less helpful in dealing 
with the challenges from religious diversity. For this, some form of natural 
theology is necessary. 
One possible response to religious diversity is skepticism about all reli-
gious claims. Religious disagreement, it is said, undermines the claims of 
any single religion to distinctive truth, and provides positive reasons for 
rejecting the claims of any particular religion as well as the claims of all 
religions collectively. Given deeply embedded incompatibilities in truth 
claims among religions, and the absence of any clear procedure for adjudi-
cating such conflicting claims satisfactorily, the wisest course surely is to 
dismiss all such claims as false or, at best, to withhold judgment concern-
ing their truth or falsity. 
This is an important perspective which deserves a much more compre-
hensive response than can be provided here. A few brief comments will 
have to suffice. An adequate response to such skepticism would involve 
demonstrating that religious disagreement by itself does not demand rejec-
tion of the claims of any particular religion nor even a general suspension 
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of judgment. Moreover, the skeptical response is often supported by 
appeal to the epistemic parity thesis, so that, it is said, no single religious 
tradition is in a rationally privileged position. Thus, an adequate response 
should also involve showing the inadequacy of the epistemic parity thesis, 
something that the fourth option to be considered below attempts to do. 
Religious pluralism is another possible response to awareness of reli-
gious diversity. Pluralism holds that it is unreasonable to reject the claims 
of all of the major religions as simply false; we should assume that despite 
clear differences among them the major religions can be said to be "in 
touch" with the same ultimate reality, thus providing equally legitimate 
religious alternatives. Religious pluralism is thus said to be rationally 
preferable to either philosophical naturalism, which dismisses all religious 
claims as unjustified, or any form of religious particularism, which main-
tains that it alone is rationally superior to other religious traditions. John 
Hick, the most influential advocate of religious pluralism in recent years, 
adopts a kind of natural theology to defend two theses: (1) It can be ratio-
nal for persons in appropriate circumstances to adopt a religious interpre-
tation of the universe rather than a naturalistic interpretation; and (2) The 
skeptical response to awareness of religious disagreement can be mitigated 
only if we adopt a pluralistic understanding of the religions as the best 
explanation for the similarities and differences across religious traditionsY 
Hick's writings over the years both exemplify and have helped to influ-
ence the shift away from demonstrative theistic arguments to the rationali-
ty of religious belief, as well as the attempt to ground such rationality in 
religious experience. For example, already in Faith and Knowledge (1957) 
Hick rejected the agenda of classical natural theology and acknowledged 
that the traditional theistic arguments are either clearly unsound or at best 
inconclusive. Rather than try to demonstrate the truth of Christian theism, 
he argued that it could be entirely reasonable or rational for a Christian in 
appropriate circumstances to believe in God, and that the rationality of 
Christian belief is grounded in what Christians take to be experiences of 
the presence and activity of God. 
We become conscious of the existence of other objects in the universe, 
whether things or persons, either by experiencing them for ourselves 
or by inferring their existence from evidences within our experience. 
The awareness of God reported by the ordinary religious believer is 
of the former kind. He professes, not to have inferred that there is a 
God, but that God as a living being has entered into his own experi-
ence. He claims to enjoy something which he describes as an experi-
ence of God. I ' 
Thirty years later, Hick expressed the principle as follows: "It is as reason-
able for those who experience their lives as being lived in the presence of 
God, to believe in the reality of God, as for all of us to form beliefs about 
our environment on the basis of our experience of it."13 
In Faith and Knowledge Hick also introduced the notions of "experienc-
ing-as", or the inherently interpretive nature of all experience, and the reli-
giously ambiguous nature of the world. Both themes have been influential 
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in subsequent philosophy of religion and are integral to his later model of 
religious pluralism. Hick distinguished three dimensions of reality implic-
it in our experiences - the natural or physical, the human and ethical, and 
the divine or religious realms. On each level there is an irreducible element 
of interpretation in our experience, with the greatest degree of epistemo-
logical ambiguity on the religious dimension. Given such ambiguity, the 
determinative factor in rational assessment is the nahlre of one's own expe-
rience. The person who experiences God interprets the totality of life theis-
tically; the one who fails to experience God interprets life naturalistically. 
Either response can be rational, depending upon's one's particular circum-
stances and experiences. 
Interestingly, although Faith and Knowledge was written in an attempt to 
defend the reasonableness of Christian belief against atheistic critiques in 
the 1950s, several decades later Hick had abandoned Christian orthodoxy 
and was an apologist for religious pluralism. But in spite of the theological 
changes, his basic epistemological framework remained intact. What 
became apparent in his later work, however, is that some of the earlier 
epistemological assumptions which were so effective in defending 
Christian belief against attacks from atheism can also be used, when modi-
fied slightly, to argue in a more general way for the rationality of non-
Christian religious beliefs on the basis of religious experiences within other 
religious traditions. This was recognized by Hick as early as 1971, in 
Arguments for the Existence of God. 
The principle which I have used to justify as rational the faith of a 
Christian who on the basis of his own religious experience cannot 
help but believing in the reality of "the God and Father of our Lord 
Jesus Christ", also operates to justify as rational the faith of a Muslim 
who on the basis of his religious experience cannot help believing in 
the reality of Allah and his providence; and the faith of the Buddhist 
who on the basis of his religious experience cannot help accepting the 
Buddhist picture of the universe; and so on.14 
Thus, although Hick's appeal to a rather modest notion of rationality and 
the centrality of religious experience in justifying Christian belief was effec-
tive in deflecting the challenge from atheism, it did so by allowing in prin-
ciple for the rationality of adherents of other religions in holding their 
respective beliefs. While it provides for the justification of a Christian 
believing as she does, it does not give positive reasons for someone else 
who does not already interpret the world "Christianly" - a Buddhist or 
atheist - to accept Christian claims as true. The later Hick, of course, 
rejects the idea that Christian theism can be shown to be distinctively true 
in favor of a model of religious pluralism which sees the major religions as 
roughly equally legitimate responses to the divine reality, the Real. 
Natural theology can play two quite different roles with respect to 
Hick's model of religious pluralism. Hick uses a kind of natural theology 
to support his model as the preferred alternative to both a reductionistic 
naturalism and various forms of religious particularism. On the other 
hand, critics of religious pluralism can also appeal to natural theology to 
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argue against Hick's model, pointing out problems with Hick's thesis and 
providing reasons for regarding orthodox Christian claims, for example, as 
distinctively true. As an explanatory model for religious diversity, Hick's 
proposal must be evaluated in terms of internal consistency and its capaci-
ty to account for phenomena of actual religious traditions, and I have 
argued elsewhere that, in spite of its undeniable appeal, it is fatally flawed 
on both countsY 
The third response to religious diversity maintains that although it is 
not possible for any single religion (including Christianity) to be shown to 
be rationally preferable to other religious and non-religious alternatives, it 
can be reasonable for a Christian in appropriate circumstances to believe 
that Christianity is distinctively true and efficacious. This perspective, 
embraced by many Christian thinkers, has the merits of combining epis-
temic modesty with recognition of the epistemic propriety (in some sense) 
of Christian beliefs. William P. Alston and Alvin Plantinga have been 
especially significant in developing this response. 
Perhaps the most influential recent attempt to ground the rationality of 
religious belief in religious experience is William P. Alston's Perceiving 
GOd16 • Alston examines "doxastic practices", or belief forming practices 
which give rise to beliefs. His argument rests upon a crucial analogy 
between practices relying upon sense perception which provide access to 
the physical world around us, resulting in beliefs about the physical world, 
and religious practices, which provide the believer with experiences or 
"perceptions" of God, thereby producing beliefs about God. In both sense 
perception and perception of God beliefs are formed by engaging in certain 
"doxastic practices", or socially established practices resulting in formation 
of appropriate beliefs. In neither case is it possible to justify the reliability 
of the doxastic practices in a strictly non-circular manner. Yet in both cases 
we have established procedures for distinguishing appropriate from inap-
propriate beliefs. Thus, he argues, beliefs formed through the relevant dox-
astic practices can be granted prima facie justification, and if there are no 
sufficient "overriders" (factors which would rebut or undermine the 
beliefs) then they can be considered "unqualifiedly justified" as well. So 
the Christian can be rationally justified in believing in God based upon his 
experience or perception of God. 
Now, as Alston himself recognizes, religious diversity presents a two-
fold challenge to his thesis. First, while Alston's argument supports the 
rationality of Christian beliefs, based upon Christian experiences of God, it 
also in principle supports the rationality of the beliefs of practitioners of 
other religions, based upon their respective religious experiences. At best, 
then, Alston's argument supports a weaker notion of rationality of religious 
belief, such that divergent religious communities all can be rational in hold-
ing their respective beliefs, even if these beliefs are in fact mutually incom-
patible. But, more significantly, religious diversity itself actually seems to 
undermine Alston's thesis about the general reliability of religious doxastic 
practices for religious belief formation. Here the differences between sense 
perception and religious perception are important. While the doxastic prac-
tices for sense perception produce similar beliefs about the external world 
among diverse peoples (water is wet for Buddhists and Christians alike), 
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the doxastic practices of different religious communities result in strikingly 
different, even incompatible, beliefs. Thus, religious diversity seems to call 
into question the reliability of any single doxastic practice, including that of 
the Christian community. For even if one form of practice is uniquely reli-
able in religious belief formation, we have no non-question-begging way of 
determining which one that is. While acknowledging the force of this objec-
tion, however, Alston concludes that it still can be rational for the Christian 
to "sit tight with the practice of which I am a master and which serves me 
so well in guiding my activity in the world" and to continue to hold 
Christian beliefs on the basis of experiences of God.!7 
In responding to Alston, however, Hick argues that if a Christian is jus-
tified in this manner in believing that Christianity is uniquely true then it 
follows that the Christian should conclude that most of the beliefs of 
adherents of other religions, based upon their respective experiences, are 
actually false. But if so, then it also follows that most of the religious beliefs 
based upon religious experience worldwide are in fact false. And thus, for 
one particular religious community to assume that its doxastic practices are 
reliable and that their beliefs are justified, when those of the other religious 
communities are not, is simply arbitrary unless this assumption can be jus-
tified on independent grounds.!' In an incisive assessment of Alston's the-
sis, William Wainwright similarly concludes that if the rationality of 
Christian beliefs is to be established then the acceptability of Christian dox-
astic practices for Christian belief formation will need to be supported by 
"introducing empirical and metaphysical arguments that establish the 
superiority of (e.g.) the Christian worldview" - a task normally associated 
with natural theology.!9 Significantly, Alston is open to some role for natur-
al theology in establishing the epistemic superiority, to some degree, of 
Christian theism to other alternatives, although he does not develop this 
possibility. Toward the end of Perceiving God, he states that "the attempt 
to argue from neutral starting points for the truth of Christian beliefs 
deserves much more serious consideration than is commonly accorded it 
today in philosophical and (liberal) theological circles. I believe that much 
can be done to support a theistic metaphysics, and that something can be 
done by way of recommending the 'evidences of Christianity'.2o 
Alvin Plantinga has also addressed the issue of religious diversity from 
the perspective of Reformed epistemology. Plantinga has provided a tren-
chant critique of "classical evidentialism", which is said to provide the epis-
temological framework within which both classical natural theology and its 
critics operated. Contrary to earlier assumptions, Plantinga claims that 
there is no need for the Christian believer to demonstrate the truth of 
Christian theism, or even to provide "sufficient reasons" for Christian faith. 
As Plantinga famously put it, it can be "entirely right, rational, reasonable, 
and proper to believe in God without any evidence or argument at all."2! 
For the Christian in appropriate circumstances, belief in God can be "prop-
erly basic" and thus ~e epistemically appropriate apart from any appeal to 
supporting evidence. More recently, Plantinga has argued that Christian 
beliefs can be warranted, where warrant is understood as that which, when 
combined with true belief, results in knowledge. Warrant is connected with 
proper function, so that" a belief has warrant just if it is produced by cogni-
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tive processes or faculties that are functioning properly, in a cognitive envi-
ronment that is propitious for the exercise of cognitive powers, according to 
a design plan that is successfully aimed at the production of true belief."23 
With respect to the challenge of religious diversity, Plantinga maintains 
that even when confronted by radical religious disagreement the Christian 
exclusivist need not defend his beliefs by appealing to reasons for accept-
ing Christian claims rather than embracing religious skepticism or the 
beliefs of another tradition.24 There is no need for the Christian to engage 
in natural theology in order to show that Christian belief is rational.25 But 
this position, whatever its merits on other grounds, provides little help in 
resolving the question raised earlier, Why should one be a Christian rather 
than a follower of another religious tradition? 
Let us assume that Plantinga is correct in saying that it can be entirely 
reasonable for belief in God to be properly basic in appropriate circum-
stances. Philip Quinn, among others, notes that this move comes with a 
price, for "this is a game any number can play. Followers of Muhammed, 
followers of Buddha, and even followers of the Reverend Moon can join 
the fun."26 Quinn's point is an important one. It is difficult to see why 
belief in God can be properly basic for Christians but fundamental beliefs 
of other religions cannot also be properly basic for their adherents.27 For 
example, the central insights of Zen Buddhism - including the belief that 
ultimate reality is sunyata, or emptiness - are said to be perceived directly 
in the experience of satori or enlightenment. They are not the product of 
rational argument, indeed evidence and argument are counter-productive 
in attaining enlightenment. Moreover, the experience of sa tori grounds the 
relevant claims. Thus, belief in emptiness as the ultimate reality is a basic 
belief for Zen Buddhists. Is it also properly basic for Buddhists? Nothing 
that I have seen shows why this could not be the case. 
Nor will it help matters to appeal to Plantinga's discussion of proper 
function at this point, for the dispute then simply shifts to the question of 
what constitutes proper function. Many Buddhists, for example, maintain 
that belief in a personal creator God is both false and the product of mal-
functioning cognitive faculties. The dispute, then, between the Christian 
and Buddhist is not merely a disagreement over what beliefs can be proper-
ly basic. It also concerns what constitutes proper function of the cognitive 
faculties, and settling that question requires determining the truth value of 
some of the central metaphysical claims of the Christian or Buddhist tradi-
tions. Why should one be a Christian rather than a Buddhist? In spite of its 
strengths in other respects, Plantinga's discussion of proper basicality, prop-
er function and warrant provides little guidance in determining whether 
Christian theism is true or rationally preferable to other altematives.2S 
The move away from the agenda of classical natural theology to the 
attempt to establish the rationality of Christian belief based upon the expe-
riences of Christians, while significant in some respects, is inconclusive. It 
can provide an effective response to some critiques of Christian theism 
from philosophical naturalism, and the arguments of Hick, Alston and 
Plantinga do support the rationality of holding Christian beliefs in appro-
priate circumstances. However, as we have seen, this involves a rather 
weak notion of rationality which cannot rule out the rationality of others -
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non-religious naturalists as well as adherents of other religions - also 
holding beliefs incompatible with Christian theism. Moreover, it provides 
no reason for the secularist, who does not have religious experiences, to 
embrace any particular religion. Thus, what is required is an approach to 
religious diversity which takes us beyond appeal merely to religious expe-
rience and reliance upon a weaker notion of rationality, and for this some 
form of natural theology is inescapable. 
III 
A fourth response to religious diversity maintains that it is possible to 
show, in some sense, that Christian theism is rationally preferable to other 
religious and non-religious alternatives. Those advocating this option 
reject a strong notion of religious ambiguity. At the same time that John 
Hick wrote Faith and Knowledge, Ninian Smart, an acknowledged authority 
on Hindu and Buddhist thought as well as a Christian analytic philoso-
pher, challenged Christians to address the question, "Why be a Christian 
rather than a Buddhist?"29 In the same 1961 essay in which he referred to 
natural theology as the "Sick Man of Europe", Smart also argued: 
Any appeal to religious experience (whether intuitive or otherwise) 
must inevitably lead to a consideration of the experience not merely 
of Christians but of Buddhists and others, and thereby to an examina-
tion of the way experience is linked to different sorts of doctrines. 
Through this investigation one is bound to ask what the criteria are 
for choosing between different formulations of religious belief. And 
from the apologetic point of view it is necessary to give reasons for 
accepting one's own faith rather than some other.30 
While rejecting the methodology and expectations of classical natural 
theology, Smart advocated a fresh kind of natural theology that takes seri-
ously the issues of competing truth claims across religions. Smart under-
stood religions as complex, multi-dimensional phenomena, with each reli-
gious tradition manifesting a particular worldview or set of core beliefs in 
terms of which it interprets humanity, the cosmos, and the religious ulti-
mate. Worldviews make explicit or implicit claims about the way things 
are, or should be, and Smart called for "worldview analysis", by which he 
meant both the analysis of the ways beliefs function internally within a sys-
tem as well as the relation between core beliefs of diverse worldviews. 
Smart contended that such analysis was incomplete unless it included 
assessment of the truth or rationality of different worldviews, and thus a 
primary task for "cross-cultural philosophy of religion" is "to clarify the 
criteria for determining the truth as between worldviews".31 
Smart spoke of this project as "soft natural theology", and although in 
later years he became increasingly preoccupied with the phenomenology 
of comparative religion, up until his death he continued to call for a 
responsible form of worldview analysis. In speaking of "soft" natural the-
ology Smart distinguished his proposal from classical natural theology. 
While recognizing that there are some non-arbitrary criteria that can be 
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applied in evaluating worldviews, and that there may be good reasons for 
accepting Christian theism as opposed to other religious alternatives, 
Smart did not think that we have demonstrative knock-down arguments 
which resolve the issues conclusively. A degree of ambiguity and uncer-
tainty is unavoidable. So even as he called for a soft natural theology in the 
context of religious diversity, Smart was fairly modest in his expectations 
for this enterprise. 
There are, of course, degrees of softness. While Smart correctly recog-
nized that with respect to religious diversity natural theology is not likely to 
be conclusive, he was perhaps excessively modest in his expectations for 
what can be accomplished through world view analysis. To be sure, the 
complexity of the issues should not be minimized. But, contrary to the epis-
temic parity thesis, is it really the case that the proposition "God exists" has 
no greater evidential or rational support than its denial? Or is it really true 
that the central claims of Theravada Buddhism or Jainism have the same 
degree of rational support as those of orthodox Christianity? I think not. 
Undoubtedly one of the most impressive recent attempts at natural the-
ology is the sustained probabilistic argument of Richard Swinburne. Over 
the course of seven books, Swinburne argues for the coherence and plausi-
bility of orthodox Christian theism.32 After rich and rigorous discussion 
(and repeated application of Bayes Theorem) Swinburne concludes that 
"on our total evidence theism is more probable than not."33 If Swinburne is 
correct tl,en strong views on religious ambiguity will need to be modified 
and there would be strong reasons for preferring Christian theism to its 
denial. 
But Swinburne constructs his argument in reference to two options -
Christian theism and its denial, atheism. As we have noted, however, 
there are many religious alternatives to Christian theism, and J. L. 
Schellenberg correctly points out that Swinburne has conducted his 
lengthy argument with almost no reference to the plausibility of other reli-
gious worldviews, nor does he include in his calculation of probabilities 
the impact of awareness of religious diversity. Schellenberg contends that 
Swinburne must show that Christian theism is "more probable than all other 
contenders".34 Swinburne, in tum, rejects Schellenberg's claim. 
I do not need to make a detailed investigation [of all other religions] 
if I can show that none of those religions even claim for themselves 
characteristics to be expected a priori of a true religion and claimed 
by Christianity, and that there is enough evidence that Christianity 
does have these characteristics. For then I will be in a position to 
argue that there are reasons adequate to show that the Christian reli-
gion is more likely to be true than they are.3' 
While Swinburne cannot be expected to investigate the claims of every other 
religion, surely the phenomena of the major religious traditions - particular 
experiences and metaphysical claims in Buddhism and Hinduism, for exam-
ple - are relevant to the calculation of the overall probability of Christian the-
ism. But it is far from clear how such factors should be assessed within the 
Bayesian probabilistic framework of Swinburne's argument. 
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Alternatively, soft natural theology in the context of religious diversity 
might focus upon the epistemic credentials of a few particular beliefs cen-
tral to certain religious worldviews. To take an obvious example, if it can 
be established that God, as understood within theism, exists, this provides 
strong reasons for rejecting the claims of religions such as Theravada 
Buddhism, which are generally regarded as incompatible with theism. 
While classical theistic arguments should continue to be explored, in light 
of the perhaps impossibly high expectations that accompany deductive 
arguments, and the lack of consensus after centuries of debate, this is prob-
ably not the most fruitful approach.36 More promising might be the cumu-
lative case, or inference to the best explanation, argument, which maintains 
that a strong case for the truth of Christian theism can be established 
through the careful accumulation and analysis of a wide variety of data 
from various dimensions of our experience and the world.37 While none of 
the phenomena, either individually or collectively, entail the truth of 
Christian theism, the argument claims that Christian theism provides a 
more plausible explanation for the data than other alternatives. There is of 
course an inescapable measure of personal judgment in such arguments, 
but this does not mean that such judgments are necessarily arbitrary. As 
William Abraham puts it, "Personal judgment simply means the ability to 
weigh evidence without using some sort of formal calculus."38 
Soft natural theology can also proceed through critique of particular 
claims made by other perspectives. We might consider the epistemology 
of religious experience and claims based upon certain kinds of introspec-
tive experiences, and in so doing challenge the epistemic parity thesis. Is it 
really the case that it is just as rational to accept as veridical purported 
experiences of Nirguna Brahman among Hindus or of Emptiness among 
Buddhists as it is to accept purported experiences of the personal God of 
Christian theism? Keith Yandell, among others, has persuasively argued 
that certain introspective enlightenment experiences at the heart of Advaita 
Vedanta Hinduism and Buddhism cannot be veridical.3Y If he is correct, this 
has significant implications for religious claims based upon such experi-
ences. Similarly, if the notion of anattta (no self) in classical Buddhism is 
indeed incoherent, as many argue, then this provides positive reason for 
rejecting a central tenet of many Buddhist traditions.40 And so on. 
Soft natural theology should be appropriately modest in expectations. 
There is no reason to expect that an appropriate natural theology in con-
texts of religious diversity requires a simple algorithmic procedure for test-
ing worldviews or even that it should seek a conclusive deductive argu-
ment for theism. Nor should we suppose that all reasonable persons, when 
presented with the relevant evidence and arguments, will be readily con-
vinced. Few issues of any real significance meet these expectations. 
Nevertheless, the claim that worldview analysis can result in identifying 
good reasons for preferring Christian theism to other alternatives seems 
eminently reasonable. 
That rational considerations of this sort can be significant in a person's 
abandoning a non-Christian worldview and embracing Christian theism is 
illustrated in the recent conversion of Paul Williams from Buddhism to 
Roman Catholicism. Williams, Professor of Indian and Tibetan Philosophy 
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and Head of the Department of Theology and Religious Studies at the 
University of Bristol, was for twenty years a practicing Buddhist and is a 
widely published scholar of Buddhism. But he recently converted to 
Roman Catholicism, and he has shared his spiritual and intellectual jour-
ney in the remarkable book The Unexpected Way: On Converting From 
Buddhism to Catholicism:! Among the factors involved in his eventual rejec-
tion of Buddhism were his growing intellectual dissatisfaction with some 
central Buddhist metaphysical and epistemological claims, including the 
inability of Buddhism to account for the contingency of the universe. It 
was Buddhism's failure to address satisfactorily the question "Why is there 
something instead of nothing?" which prompted Williams to look again at 
theism. As he puts it, "I have come to believe that there is a gap in the 
Buddhist explanation of things which for me can only be filled by God, the 
sort of God spoken of in a Christian tradition such as that of St. Thomas 
Aquinas." Williams is worth quoting at length on this point: 
Why is there something rather than nothing? Why is there any-
thing at all? And why is there a world in which, among other things, 
the processes (causation, etc.) detected by the Buddha are the case? 
Why is it that this way of things is the way of things? As the Buddhist 
scriptures (sutras) have it: "Whether Buddhas occur or do not occur, 
the true way of things (Sanskrit: dharmata) remains." Why? Why is it 
like that? The dharmata is not what we call "necessarily existent". That 
is, there is no logical contradiction in a world in which things are not 
like that.... Thus the dharmata, the true way of things, is contingent. It 
could have been otherwise .... We have a contingent fact or state of 
affairs, how things happen to be in the actual world, for which we are 
entitled to ask the reason .... 
Any answer to that question - if there is one - would have to be 
a necessary being, a being about which it would make no sense to ask 
the question why that exists rather than not. For the theist God is the 
answer to this question, and God is needed as the ultimate explana-
tion for existence at any time, keeping things in whatever existence 
things have. 
I think I have to agree with the theist. 
For me the question "Why is there something rather than noth-
ing?" has become a bit like what Zen Buddhists call a koan. It is a con-
stant niggling question that has worried and goaded me (often, I 
think, against my will) into a different level of understanding, a dif-
ferent vision, of the world and our place in it:' 
In teasing out the implications of contingency - in turning Leibniz's 
question into a Zen koan - Williams captures nicely what is at the heart of 
classical cosmological arguments and applies it effectively in worldview 
analysis, in this case, analysis of Buddhist metaphysics. Here is a creative 
and promising suggestion for soft natural theology with respect to reli-
gious diversity. The analogy to a Zen koan is intriguing, for just as the koan 
is used in Zen to prompt one to see reality from a radically new perspec-
tive, so too soft natural theology in worldview analysis ought to stimulate 
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reconsideration of basic ontological assumptions, prodding one to the rec-
ognize the plausibility of Christian theism. 
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